Brad Mendheim

No legislative voting record (judicial candidate)

Brad Mendheim has not held legislative office. Under the principal's judicial rule the record lane is official rulings and opinions; see the Opinions items. Checked 2026-09-24.

On the Nov. 3, 2026 general election ballot for Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Place 7 — Republican (unopposed)

Name on ballot: “BRAD MENDHEIM”, Republican. No Democratic or independent candidate is listed for Place 7; the only other line is a write-in. Incumbent (appointed Jan. 22, 2018; official name Brady E. Mendheim, Jr.). Judicial candidate: the record lane is official rulings and opinions, not votes. 'In their words' is limited to the candidate's own campaign statements (Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 7).

On the Nov 3, 2026 general ballot — Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Place 7

Republican nominee · certified

Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Place 7 · AL-SUPCT-7

Republican · Incumbent · On the 2026 ballot

Concurred in the result, with opinion: LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C. (consolidated with Burdick-Aysenne v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C.) (SC-2022-0515, SC-2022-0579)

Majority (Mitchell, J.): Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act applies to all unborn children without exception, including frozen embryos destroyed in a cryogenic nursery, and the statute contains no implicit exception for extrauterine children. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim agreed that the Wrongful Death Act applies to frozen embryos but wrote separately to dispute the main opinion's characterization of the defense's arguments and to warn that if the legislature does not 'provide more leadership in this area of the law,' there 'could be unfortunate consequences stemming from today's decision that no one intends.' Vote line: Wise, Bryan, JJ., concur. Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion. Shaw, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Stewart, J., joins. Mendheim, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. Sellers, J., concurs in the result in part and dissents in part, with opinion. Cook, J., dissents, with opinion. Disposition: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded (trial court's dismissal of wrongful-death claims reversed).

Wrote the Court's opinion: Springhill Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Springhill Memorial Hospital v. West (SC-2022-0719)

Substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the hospital's administration of a grossly excessive Dilaudid dose to a postsurgical patient constituted wantonness; the court declined SMH's invitation to revive the unconstitutional §6-5-547 statutory cap on punitive damages in medical-malpractice wrongful-death cases, holding that only the legislature can fix the constitutional defect identified in Smith v. Schulte (1995). Mendheim's writing: Mendheim declined to judicially revive §6-5-547's punitive-damages cap, holding that since the legislature has explicitly enacted other laws addressing medical-malpractice damages since Schulte, it is for the legislature—not the Court—to re-enact a constitutionally sound cap if it chooses to do so. Vote line: Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, Sellers, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur. Disposition: Affirmed (jury verdict and trial court's remittitur to $10 million in punitive damages both upheld).

Wrote the Court's opinion: Sampson v. HeartWise Health Systems Corporation (SC-2022-0847)

HeartWise entities (as software licensors providing a cardiovascular screening program, not licensed health-care providers) did not owe a duty of care and summary judgment in their favor was proper; as to the individual physicians, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether they met the standard of care in evaluating the patient's cardiovascular condition, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on grounds not raised by the physicians' own motion. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim held that a trial court may not grant a summary judgment on grounds that a party never raised in its own motion—a protection of the non-movant's right to notice—and that the plaintiff had introduced sufficient evidence of physician negligence to survive summary judgment on the properly raised issues. Disposition: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, remanded.

Wrote the Court's opinion: Blackburn v. Shire US Inc. (1210140)

Answering questions certified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: (1) under Alabama's learned-intermediary doctrine, a pharmaceutical company's duty to warn may include providing prescribing physicians with adequate instructions on how to monitor for known drug risks; (2) whether the labeling at issue satisfied that duty requires fact-specific analysis not amenable to a per se rule. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim answered the Eleventh Circuit's certified questions by holding that Alabama's failure-to-warn doctrine for prescription drugs encompasses monitoring instructions when drug risks are known, while declining to resolve as a matter of law whether Shire's label adequately described the monitoring protocol for its ADHD drug Vyvanse. Disposition: Certified questions answered.

Wrote the Court's opinion: Ex parte Affinity Hospital, LLC d/b/a Grandview Medical Center; Ex parte Raymond Chad Wade, M.D. (Davis v. Affinity Hospital) (1210160, 1210191)

When Alabama Medical Liability Act's two-year limitations period is clearly expired on the face of the complaint for claims against a specific defendant first named in an amended pleading, mandamus lies to compel dismissal; the plaintiff's own pre-suit medical-records review showed she identified Dr. Wade before the limitations period closed. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim held that a hospital physician added as a defendant nearly a year after the original complaint was filed was obviously time-barred, because the plaintiff had obtained and reviewed medical records—and therefore had constructive knowledge of the physician's role—well before the two-year limitations period expired. Disposition: Petitions granted; writ issued directing circuit court to dismiss amended complaint as to Affinity Hospital and Dr. Wade.

Wrote the Court's opinion: Ex parte Abbott Laboratories (Mobile County Board of Health v. Fisher) (1191001)

Public health entities' opioid-epidemic claims against pharmaceutical manufacturer Abbott Laboratories are time-barred on the face of the complaint by Alabama's rule of repose and applicable statutes of limitations, because the complaint itself alleged that Abbott's allegedly tortious conduct and its harms began and were known more than six years before suit was filed. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim held that mandamus is available when it is clear from the complaint's own allegations that the rule of repose has run, and that the Mobile County Board of Health's allegations—which traced Abbott's marketing and the opioid crisis to events more than a decade before filing—made the time bar evident without discovery. Disposition: Petition granted; writ issued directing circuit court to dismiss all claims against Abbott.

Wrote the Court's opinion: Ex parte GASP (GASP v. Jefferson County Board of Health) (1171082)

Alabama's Air Control Act's preemption clause in §22-28-23(a) preempts only substantive air-pollution-control regulations, not the procedural requirements of the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act (AAPA); a party challenging a Board of Health rulemaking action under the Air Control Act must be afforded AAPA procedural rights. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim disagreed with the Court of Civil Appeals' sweeping preemption holding, instead finding that the Air Control Act's preemption language—directed at 'the field of air pollution control'—does not cover administrative challenge procedures, so AAPA requirements for judicial review of the Board's rulemaking remain operative. Disposition: Affirmed (on different grounds than Court of Civil Appeals).

Wrote the Court's opinion: Castellanos v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama School of Medicine (Ex parte Board of Trustees) (1170183)

The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama has absolute constitutional immunity under Art. I, §14, Ala. Const. 1901, which is a non-waivable jurisdictional bar; the circuit court lacked power to compel the Board to arbitrate a physician's employment claims even after the Board mistakenly joined co-defendants' motion to compel arbitration. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim held that §14 immunity is absolute and cannot be waived by conduct, including by a state entity mistakenly joining a motion to compel arbitration filed by non-immune co-defendants, and that the circuit court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Disposition: Petition granted; writ issued directing circuit court to dismiss claims against Board.

Wrote the Court's opinion: Nichols v. HealthSouth Corporation (1151071)

Employee shareholders' claims against HealthSouth for fraud in the purchase of company stock are direct (not derivative) claims under applicable Delaware corporate law, and the amended complaint relates back to the original filing for limitations purposes; Rule 23.1 derivative-suit procedures do not apply. Mendheim's writing: Mendheim held that employees suing for fraud affecting their personal share purchases—not the corporation itself—bring direct claims and are not subject to Rule 23.1's demand requirements, and that their amended complaint adding new plaintiffs related back to the timely-filed original complaint. Vote line: Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Main, and Bryan, JJ., concur. Disposition: Reversed and remanded.